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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utal1
~rOSES

BLANCH..-'\RD,

Plaintiff and Appellant

-vsDONALD E. S~IITH, et al,
Defendants and
Respondents.

RESPONDENTS'
BRIEF
No. 7869

·sTATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents believe appellant's statement of facts
is incomplete, erroneous and misleading in part, and
therefore do not adequately "picture" to this court the
basis for the lower court's decision and so considers
that the following corrective as well as additional facts
will be helpful, particularly because appellant attempts
to stress bits of isolated and unimportant testimony
which the lower court refused to follow as being controlling. In this regard it is also pointed out that
the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and
observed their demeanor and conduct on the witness
stand, and was therefore in a favorable position
to weigh the testimony. Under these circumstances,
the judgment of the trial court should not be
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lightly disregarded. The trial court found all of the
is~ues in favor of the defendants.

rrhe defendants are husband and wife and each of
the1n of the age of 58 years. The -defendant, Fern P.
Snlith, is an only child of Frank Purser, deceased, and
she bought the property from her father's estate April
12, 1941, and ever since then defendants' son and his
wife have resided thereon. Frank Purser purchased the
property under contract from George Tiller in 1916 and
he resided upon the property from that time to the time
of his death. Ever since 1916, Frank Purser in his
lifetime ,and since his death, these defendants, have
always had and claimed the property between their
north and south fence lines ( tr. 4) without-..interruption
or claim on the part of anybody and had no suggestion
from any source that the property within the fence
lines was claimed -by anyone until the year 1948 when
the plaintiff claimed to be the owner of 19 feet north
of defendants' south fence line.
Both plaintiff and defendants' property is derained
from a common source: via Halvor 0. Tiller's estate.
~ Tiller acquired the property January 8, 1879. (Def Ex.
1 page 4). He died Feb. 28, 1901, leaving surviving him
three daughters, Anna, Helen, and Edith, then of the
ages of 20, 17, and 15 years, respectively, and a son,
George, then of the age of 13 years. Decree of distribution was entered July 5, 1902, and the real property was distributed by metes and bounds to three
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of the children,

J1~dith

3
getting the south 4 rods, (now

O\\"ned by plaintiff), George the middle piece( now
O\vned by defendants), and Helen the north part not
directly involved in this action. ( Defs. Ex. 1 page 5).
Although plaintiff so states on page 2 of his brief, never·
theless none of the property so distributed by decree of
distribution ""'"as surveyed during probate (tr. B 6-8).
It is plain that the survey was made at the time of the
sale of Edith's tract of land to plaintiff about three
years later. (tr. 60, 66). Edith conveyed to plaintiff
August 1, 1904 (Pis. ex. A, page 6). This then made
plaintiff and George Tiller, who was then about 14
or 15 years of age adjoining landowners. It is plain that
the court was justified in finding from the testimony
of Edith Tiller, George Tiller and Anna T. Peery that
the estate property when distributed was all in one
enclosure, bounded on the south by a fence line (tr. 3-4),
on the east by a solid picket fence, on the north by
Logan River~ ''or maybe a wire fence," on the west by
Brigham Young College Campus, which is separated
from the Tiller property by a slough as well as a fence.
At the time, or shortly after plaintiff purchased
his property, he wanted to know the boundry lines. No
one knew them. ( tr. 4, 5, 60, 45-46). Anna Tiller attempted to fix the lines by measuring herself, but at
the suggestion of attorney W. W. ~1aughan a surveyor
was called and he, the surveyor, fixed the boundary
lines. (tr. 60-61, 4, 5). Plaintiff claims at page 2-3 of
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hi::.; brief that Logan City owned 1 rod of land "which
the lower court refused to notice, meet or recognize"
(finding No. 6 - tr. 13),
tbPJn

all,"

but

there

is

"and that _this fooled
nothing

in the

record

to show that the surveyor was directed in his survey.
l~.,rom

all that appears in the record he simply performed

his survey professionally. In fact the court found Logan

City never owned the 1 rod strip. Plaintiff and his
predecessor, the Tillers, have always been in possession
of the

property. Plaintiff never used or claim-

ed any of the property north of the fence while Anna
Peery lived there which was until 1908 (tr. 62), or
while George Tiller lived there until 1916 (tr. 2, 5, 6),
or while Mrs. Grace w. Tiller, wife of George Tiller,
lived there from 1909 to 1916 (tr.73), or while Frank
Purser and these defendants lived there (tr. B 24-30)
(tr. 22, 23, 75, 76). In fact while defendants have
owned the property plaintiff tore down and rebuilt
part of the: original fence in the same place (tr. 75, 76)
and yet plaintiff states (page 2 of brief tr. 76) that
he knew for a long time that the fence was not on
the boundary line. But then plaintiff states too he
never entertained any thought that the fence was not
on true line until 1948, about 45 years after he built
the original fence and this was after rebuilding it in
· part; that he first questioned the fence when the curb
and gutter was put in by Logan Ci~y in 1948 (tr.41,
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-!8) ..A.fter the fence 'Yas built plaintiff built his house,
garage~

chicken coup, etc., all 'vith reference to the

fence line (tr. 40-42) ..l\.lso planted trees (tr. B 45)
(tr. B 7-S). G. Blanchard states inconsistently that although he had no idea they o\\rned anything north of
the fence line yet they claimed and used it as right-of"Tay ( tr. 37). And then plaintiff claimed his use was
onl~-r because agreeable to his neighbors (tr. 36, 37, 79).
All of defendants' witnesses denied any use at all.
Ever since erection of fence by plaintiff he has
been in possession of the property south of the fence
line and has paid taxes thereon upon receipt of a
tax notice wherein the property was described in form
as conveyed to him, and the defendants and their pre·
decessors in interest have always done likewise. Each
have always paid for the sidewalk and sewer improvements according to the frontage (tr. B 18) of the respective tracts they were in possession of and plaintiff has always been in possession of 4 rods. When the
curb and gutter was put in Logan City adopted a different method of assessing the cost thereof-from the
record instead of according to the actual frontage
covered-(tr. B 73-80) and this was the first time
plaintiff even thought that the property described in
the deed and that which he was actually in possession of
might not be identical. (tr. 32). He learned this from
a notice which appeared in the newspaper. (pls. ex.
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tiff paid the $16.50 to Logan City and upon learning of
it defendants offered to repay him. (tr. B 21), and so

Logan City quitclaimed 1 rod strip to plaintiff. (Pls.
ex. l")). Because of this expenditure of $16.50 for the
quitclahn deed, he, plaintiff, wanted to move the fence
line north 19 feet (16Yz feet by reason of the rod covered
in the quitclaim deed, and also 2Yz feet which he said
he was short between the fence lines upon which he
had lived for 45 years or more), and in the alternative
complains that the lower court failed to compensate
him for taxes, etc., mentioned at the top of page 6
of his brief. Appellant claims that because Logan City
conveyed to him there was a mutual mistake of fact.
If this is so then everytime a boundary line established
by the parties is in error, there is a mutual mistake
of fact. The issue as to the 19 ft. was made by defendants counterclaim. No objection was made during the
trial. See rule 15 (244 P. 2, 360). Appellant also claims
the court erred in finding : ''Through a mixup in
connection with the assessment of property, the said
1 rod above referred to has never been assessed for
taxes. '' If Logan City never paid any taxes thereon,
nor did these defendants and their predecessors who
owned the excess in the block, then why is the court
not correct~ Furthermore, how did this harm appellant~ He does not show. He, appellant, only paid
taxes on the property he was in possession of.
We will answer appellant's argument and statements
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in the order advanced in his brief and also show the
lo"rer court ~s decision in the matter is eminently equitable and fair and corrert and should be affirmed.
ARGl~iliENT

POINT NO. 1: THE LOWER COURT FULLY MET
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT THERE WAS
.A. ~IISTAKE OF F.L\.CT AND UPON SUBSTANTIAL
E'TIDENCE DECIDED THE ISSUES AGAINS1.,
HI~I.

Beginning at page 8 in an attempt to show a mistake
of fact he quotes bits of testimony from the record. It
is garbled. On page 9 Geo. Tiller is quoted as saying:
''I never heard before that the surveyor gave me over
5 rods and Blanchard less than three.'' I have searched
the record and I can find no such statement. At page
10 counsel puts the following question to Geo. Tiller,
"According to your testimony he gave Mose less than
3 rods and he gave you about 5 and a fraction,'' to
which the witness answered: ''Why~'' Question: ''Because that fence is down there 19 feet on his ground."
.A.nswer: "I never heard that before." This is far froxn
being the statement claimed for by counsel. Both questions asked for by counsel assumed facts unfair to the
witness, but the court was not mislead because of the
form of the question. The last question even intimates
plaintiff owned the land he claims to have acquired from
Logan City by the quitclaim deed in 1904 when the
property was surveyed. The next statement counsel
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quotes is also equally garbled: ''I didn't intend to deed
a"~ay

any of Blanchard's property." (tr. 14). The

court's attention is directed to tr. 14. The statement
"·a~ not 1nade by the witness as given l.n the brief. Line

13-'' And you didn't intend. to deed part of Mose
Blanchard's property." Answer: "No sir, I didn't.''
...~gain the question even assumes Blanchard had pro·
perty there in 1904. No where in the record is there
any such claim. The substance of the remaining testiInony quoted by appellant to the effect that Geo. Tiller
figured Mose Blanchard got 4 rods south of the fence,
that the deeds would call for the right. property, is
no doubt correct. The witness so thought. Both Blanchard and Geo. Tiller believed the fence ws put where
it should be. TheY: both belived the surveyor was right
and from that time on regarded it as the boundry
line of their property.
The balance of the testimony quoted on page 9 and
at the top of page 10 is tricky. ''That one rod fooled
us all, I am satisfied about that." "When <lid you
find out about that." These answers are based upon
the correctness of counsel's question that Logan City
owned the one rod and that the surveyor was fooled.
It is against finding No. 6 of the court that Logan City
never was the owner of the 1 rod. The giving of a quit·
claim deed does not imply the conveyance of any
particular interest in property. The grantee acquires
only the interest of the, grantor, be that interest what
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it 1nay. Nix Y~. Tooele Co., 118 Pac. 2d 376 (Utah).
And the court's finding is well

~upported

by the

evi-

dence. See full testin1ony of 'vitnesses Crockett and
1larler, transcripts ..:-\ and B. Neither abstract introduced
in evidence sho,Ys Logan City to be the o'vner of the
1 rod of property. The abstractor who testified at
the trial (tr. SS, 89, 90, 91, 94, 95) says Logan City
never had title so far as his search reveals. Just
ho'Y long since the south fenee 'vas built is not certain,
but Anna T. Peery, who was 71 years when she
testified in court upon the trial (tr. 59) stated the fence
was up when she was a child because ''us kids used
to sit on the fenee and watch the circus go through
that lane to get to the B. Y. Campus when we were
young" (tr. 64). That during all these years no action
has been orought by anyone to move the fence or to
claim that plaintiff or his predecesors in interst were
not the true and lawful owners of the property to the
south fence. Only the plaintiff wants to move his north
fenee because Logan City gave him a quitclaim deed
after he himself built the fence about 45 years ago. He
is also envious because he thinks George Tiller and
subsequently these defendants as his successors in
interest got more land out of the Tiller Estate than
he did. There no doubt was a surplus in the block (tr. B
8, 9, 11). The north line of the Tiller esate property
was not certain (tr. 13, 14). The river had been moved
(tr. 67). A new road had been built to the B. Y. Campus.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii-------~.~-:~~

";;~

~i.f:!

;J

11 'M

SUP~l&Q i.~~QJ;,t

Cnmee aow ...,.._,.
~oentlF

·~v~

....,..

~~-

-·

~®@I (l= nl®ti114
!!:1 Aft . ·t ; ;~~·A;~.

-

·~t· !Hlt

fl:rtd

~-

de•1n• \a ritA U. follOwlftl

unoovered ca••• ,,,._ ta ..,.r\ of fola\ t<o. 1

lllNned 3\ PftP 10 ot' fte~e' Jrlet.

t,o Itt

&e•JIIIDII••• ...-

t.end both of \he.. WJ7 ree• oases tollNq lfote .-. :=:ill•

laer,

RPJ'I,,

t1JIIad•'1r ...,.n

t.a.t tae\e

touc&, • • '

~•1t1on•

aleo

or

\he . .. , . ·~· •

'tllbleb are

Ute~

udia•.a•

r-· .. ,..

aM \ba\ ~

relate •PP1'llaat 1 e oont8Mloae. Tille

....,. a. ott11l•lllr 111 potat, - . . ,
~--

dMteioa oa

pante• ltdl4tletll7 tw .,,..

•• 1n ttt• •••• .,

\baa 4J ,.a,n ,.,..... tt.

I

u. DftWMa t.btlr propert1••·
tlrap• Y•• a....u (V\ala) 117 •••· 2nd en.
&okborr . . . . ., ... (ttt.ll) 139 .... 2nd aos.

'I

~...,

-

Ill UJ JUIII.·

r

w, aU

hlra,Sua !liat..h

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

b

u'

11
the fence lines \Yt~re even established by tenants of
the o"~ners thus negativing entirely any agreement on
the part of the O"\vners ; they did, ho,vever, recognize
the fence lines as the boundry line by acquiescence and
"·onld not therefore later be permitted to deny that it
\Yas the boundry line. _..:-\ppellant quotes, but fails to
sho'v just ho\Y his facts fit into Holmes vs, Judge.
In Tripp vs. Bagley, supra, the facts are different.
There both parties kne'v when the fence was being
built the fence " . . as not on the true boundry line. There
'Yere no per1nanent improvements placed in reliance
upon an established fence boundry line. C~rtainly appellant would not undertake to say in the case at
bar both parties knew where the true line was. If so,
why then even ask where the line was~ Why take the
word of a survyor~ vVhy build buildings with reference
to the line and observe it as the boundry line for about
45 years? Appellant cannot by any analogy bring these
facts within those of the Tripp case.

Rydalch vs. Anderson, supra, is a case where the
original owners built a boundary line fence 'before the
property was surveyed by the government. so that at
the time neither could possibly know where the true
line was. Later a survey was made so that the section
lines and corners were then well established and easily
ascertainable. But the owners still continued to regard
the fence as a boundry line. Said the court at page
29, right-hand column:
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''That the boundry was open, and visibly marked
on the ground by a fence which appellant's
seemed anxious to maintain and make permanent long after he had obtained title from
the United States to the land in dispute, and
long after the land had been surveyed, so that
he at least had the means of ,knowledge, if
he did not actually know where the government
lines were located, is also beyond cavil." And
again, ''The whole world, including respondent,
therefore had a right to assume that the ownership of the land in fact was what those in
interest held it out to be. Appellant, as the mere
successor of his father, is estopped, if his father
would have been.'' The court then concludes
that the father would be estopped.
Respondent believes this case also is in his favor.
In fact, in the case at bar, one element here is more
flagarant: Plaintiff even testified that he knew for a
long time that the fence was wrong, that it was 2Y2
feet short of giving him 4 rods, and still the record
is silent about him ever complaining to either George
~riller, Frank Purser, or the defendants, and yet he
now wants to move the fence although it has been
up for about 45 years, during all of which time he
regarded it as the boundry line. That the fence line
was visible and well established, see picture exhibits
and tr. B. The lower court in its finding no. 3 ( tr. 12)
in addition to stating that the means of ascertaining
the true line has always been available, could have
gone further and found that the plaintiff actually kne'v
(according to his own tesimony) that the fence was
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11ot on the true line, and did nothing throughout the
vears
but held out that it was on the true line bv..
.
acknowledging the fence and so i8 now for that reason
estopped. Rydalch P. Anderson, supra.
Counsel for appellant at page 11 of brief states
that the la"'" here involved is annotated in 69 ALR14301533, following, Tripp vs. Bagley, supra, and that altho
there are some cases to the contrary, the big majority
there cited under the subhead "Effect of Mistake"
hold in harmony with Brown vs. Milliner. It is submitted that this statement is not borne out either by
the facts or as to the law. As above shown,
the facts in the case of Tripp vs. Bagley and
those in the case at bar are as different as is night
from day. The Trip case is discussed in Brown vs.
Milliner, supra, and at page 208, left-hand column,
in that case the court says :
"But the Tripp case does not require a party
relying upon a boundary which has been acquiesced in for a long period of time to produce
evidence that the location of the true boundary
was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute. That
the true boundary was uncertain or in dispute
and that the parties agreed upon the recognized
boundary will be implied from the parties'
long acquiescence.''
In this case the defendant could know nothing about how
the fence line was established (they are now 58 years
of age) were it not for the fact that George Tiller
and his sister, Mrs. Peery are still alive and so when
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plaintiff 'van ted to move the fence line they investigated.
Appellant then at page 11 cites Brown vs. ~1:illiner,
supra, to the effect that this case holds "that when
a party has acted under a mistake of fact, especially
a mutual mistake of fact, such party is not estopped,
but may claim to the true line upon discovery of the
mistake just as plaintiff tried to do when he discoverd
his mistake.'' It is submitted that the holding in that
case justifies no such state1nent 'vhen attempt is made
to fit these facts into that statement. In that case the
lower court was reversed because the record did not
sustain the lower court's finding that ''the old channel
of Weber River was mutually recognized and acquiesced
in as the boundry between the property now owned
by the palintiff and the defendant." (Page 208, lower
left-hand column) No stretch of the imagination could
contend such statement fit the facts in the case at bar.
Here the plaintiff recognized the fence the court
found he built during all the, time George Tiller and his
successors in interest, Frank Purser and these defendants, have resided upon the property, until 1948 when
first complaint was made. Defendants' contend that
Brown vs. Milliner is also a case in their favor and
rely upon it.
Counsel then at the top of page 12 of brief refers
· to and quotes from some cases cited bginning on page
1486 of 69 ALR, many of which are old southern ones.
A reference to these cases show that the factual basis
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for the quotes are so different from the facts in the

case at bar that the quotes cannot possibly have any
1neaning so far as this case is concerned. Nor do they
represent the 1uajority vie\v. It is belived that the
cases cited on pages 1485 and 1486 of 69 ALR under
the title "Effect of ~[istake" are more in keeping
\\~ith the decisions and trends of the holding of our
own court. Many of the cases cited are western ones,
and the facts given are for the most part applicable. A
case very similar in facts to the case at bar is Davies
vs. Lynham 247 Pac. 294 (Utah) cited in Brown vs.
~Iilliner at page 207. See also Am. Jur. Boundaries,
Effect of Mistake of Fact, Sec. 77, citing 69 ALR 1485
to the effect that landowners may when in doubt as
to boundary line orally agree where it shall be etc., and
also to the effect when innocent third parties have
intervened they may be estopped, as also they may be
upon discovery of the true line if they do not immediately
disavow the oral line agreed upon, citing 69 ALR 1486.
Point No. 3: THE PARTIES DID NOT KNOvV
FENCE WAS NOT ON THE TRUE LINE.
At the top of page 13 counsel next states: "Parties
knew fence was not on true line.'' This statement just
simply is not borne out by the facts. Certainly at the
time the survey was made neither party knew where
the dividing line was and that is the time that counts
and there is nothing in the record to show that defendants or any of their predecessors at any time were
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aware that the fence was not on the true boundary
line as called for by their respective deeds. But plaintiff upon the trial stated that he knew for a long time
the fence was not on the line. If he did, w4y then did
he not
kne'v

complain~

it~

,Just when did he learn this, if he

As late as 1943, he rebuilt part of the fence,

and this was done after the defendants became the
owner of the property. Why did he do this~ That such
facts do not bring this case within the holding of Tripp
vs. Bagley is too obvious for discussion. If plaintiff
knew the boundary line was in error then he concealed
such fact from all of the parties who have resided on the
premises and he should not now be rewarded for such
conduct. I cannot find any justification for counsel's
statement on page 14 that the Tripp case says: "If
one of the adjoining landowners has knowledge, or
understands, that the fence in question is not on the
true line, the rule permitting a boundary line to be
fixed by parol agreement or acquiescence does not
apply." I believe the case stands for no such rule.
Even if it did, then it is submitted that it must refer
to knowledge of error at the time the fence is located,
not knowledge later acquired, because even then no
matter when acquired, certainly it becomes the duty
of the party to make the error known promptly unless
he desired to waive or ratify the error. He cannot idly
sit by. And even if he does make it know many cases
still hold that if the fence has been up for many years
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and agreed upon as the dividing line it cannot then
be 1uoved, particularly if innocent third parties have
relied upon the fence line.
Point No.4: THERE WAS DISPUTE AND UNCERTAIN~Y ACTUALLY AND LEGALLY:
.A.t page 14 counsel next discusses ''No Dispute and

No l~ncertainty" and then states that the court "found
that there had never been any dispute concerning the
boundary line between them.'' This statement is mi~
leading and it is subn1itted not accurate. The court
found in finding No. 2 (tr. 9) that all of the parties
were in doubt as to the location of the boundary line
so that the line separating plaintiff's property and
George Tiller's property was unknown and uncertain.
A surveyor was then called and he made a survey and
upon this line (thus accepting the findings of the
surveyor) the. fence was mutually agreed to be and
upon which the plaintiff erected the fence. In finding
No. 3 (tr. 11) the court found that after the erection
of the fence each used the lands adverse to the other
and that neither defendants nor their predecessors in
interest ''ever knew that there was any thought of
dispute as to the property line until at the time herein-before mentioned.'' This refers, of course, to after the
erection of the fence and not before. That the plaintiff
and defendants and their grantors testified that there
was no dispute concerning the boundary line simply
shows that they all regarded the fence as the boundary
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line. It does not refer to before the fence was built.
Appellant then quotes from Talbot vs. Smith, 107
Pac. 480 (Ore) to defeat the description in a deed the
plaintiff urged that a fence line or stake set up by
so1neone has been acquiesced in and should control. And

in Jefferies vs. Sheehan 242 Mich. 167, 218 N. W. 703,
where the language quoted shows there never was a
dispute. These statements upon their face show that the
facts are entirely different from those at bar and
can have no application. In passing it should be observed
also that in Talbot vs. Smith, supra, syllabus No. 4,
it is stated that even where the fence is by mistake
supposed to be on the boundary line that after ten
years of adverse occupancy by another under claim of
title it could not be moved. Defendants and their predecessors in interest have been in possession for about
45 years. Counsel then states that defendant's cannot
succeed in their conuterclaim for they have failed to
pay taxes. In answer to this it might be asked, how
then can plaintiff succeed when they have been out
of possession of the 19 foot strip for about 45 years.
The answer of course is that this is a boundary line
case which defendants set up in their counterclaim.
The recognized rule is in keeping with the finding
of the lower court that the line sought to be established
be doubtful, uncertain or in dispute. See 8 Am. Jur.
Boundaries, Sec. 74, page 799, the cases cited following note 11 including 69 ALR 1443, et seq, wherein is
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cited Tripp vs. Bagley, supra. The subject, "Necessity
and sufficiency of dispute or uncertainty'' is further
annotated in 113 ALR page 425, et seq, to which
reference is made. Appellant seetns to labor under the
impression that in order for there to be a ''dispute''
it is necessary for there to be a fight or a quarrel.
Such is not the case. The annotation just referred to
cites an excellent number of illustrations. They hold
for example : ''No dispute in the sense of a quarrel
or ill feeling between the parties is necssary. '' Moniz
vs. Peterman 31 Pac. 2d 353 (Calif.). If the location
of the line between contiguous landowners has not
been definitely established, or is otherwise doubtful
a.nd uncertain, and they orally agree to be bound
by a line then established by the agreement, the
agreed line will be adhered to by the court.
Sammann vs. Dietrich (Tex.) 39 SW (2d) 647.
It is not necessary that the true line be absolutely
unascertainable, nor that it could have ·been determined
by a survey. Sobol vs. Gulinson( Colo.) 28 Pac. 2d,
810. In fact, in Coleman vs. Smith, 55 Tex. 254 referred to in 69 ALR page 1485 attention is drawn to
the fact that even different surveys may differ. In
Caputo vs. Mariatti (1934) Pa. Super. Ct. 314, 173 A.
770, the owner of a plot of ground subdivided it into
lots, placing stakes in the ground, that thereafter
purchasers of two contiguous lots erected a division
fence following the stakes, and the court held the
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stakes controlled. The above are simply a few of the
1nany cases cited in the annotations referred to which
shows the kind of dispute and uncertainty necessary,
legally.
Appellant then contends uncertainty or indefiniteness 'vas not proved by making reference to 11 C.J.S.
538..9. and also Hartun vs. Witte (1884) 59 Wis. 285,
18 N.W. 174. Such a contention is thoroughly unsound.
It is in conflict with all bound.aries established orally
and does not fall within the subject under consideration.
That question is treated in the same work counsel
refers to 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, Sec 67, page 638 and.
sections following. Appellant next states the burden of
proof is upon respondents and cites 8 Am. Juris.
page 810 and 69 ALR 1489. Respondents agree with
this and contend they fully discharged this burden
upon the trial.
'

Point No. 5: THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN
.1\GREEMENT.
Inasmuch as this has been previously treated by a
reference to the survey made, that plaintiff lived with
the fence for 45 years without objection, re-built part
of it as late as 1943, it is so obvious that he agreed to
the fence as the boundary line that this will not be
pursued further. In Holmes vs. Judge, supra, it was
held that there need be no agreement if the parties
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reeognized the fence sufficiently long. See also 8 Am.
Jur. Boundaries, Sec. 75, page 799. 69 ALR 1466.
Acquiescence. See 69 ALR 1491 (citing Inany Utah cases)
further annotated in 113 ALR 432. When acquiescence
l1as been for sufficiently long time it is immaterial
that established line does not agree with conveyances.
Counsel next states that the court found: "plaintiff's
property was distributed in accordance with the survey
directed by the late W. W. Maughan." I am unable
to find any such finding by the court. Finding No. 2
and 3 ( tr. 9-10) is directly contra. There is positively
nothing in the eivdence to show any survey was made
at any time during probate of the Tiller estate. Distribution was simply made by metes and bounds, but
no survey was had. To so distribute is a common
practice with which every lawyer is familiar. Next
counsel says: ''Why would plaintiff want a survey
2>1 years later~ ' ' I can find no such evidence to this
effect. But if so, then why does he let the matter go
on for an additional 42Yz years and then attempt to
change a boundary he permitted to remain and later
purchased by innocent third parties~ If he did this, then
he should now certainly be estopped. See 8 Am. J ur. page
800, Sec, 77, Effect of Mistake of Fact, where the rights
of innocent third parties have intervened. Also 69 ALR
1485- 86, 1520.
Appellant at page 17 and 18 makes further reference
to testimony and attempts to ''make fun'' of some of
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it. Reference to contra testimony has previously been
given and so no further comment will here be made.
llowever, it must be brought to the court's attention
that Anna Peery, now of Ogden, and Mr. and ~Irs,,
George Tiller, now of Brigham City, all testified that
'vhile they lived next door to plaintiff that they were
always neighborly and friendly. They were unacquainted
~ith defendants, (tr. B 10).. Yet when called upon to
testify their unbiased testimony favored the defendant8.
There was no reason to disbelieve either or any of them
and the lower court who saw them apparently had no
hesitation in believing them. The statements counsel
criticize for being made by Mrs. Peery at the bottom
of page 17 are: "I know he built it because I saw him.
I didn't build it. My father didn't build it. I say Mose
did it or his boys did." It is perfectly understandable
how any witness while on the stand could so testify
and yet not be any ground for questioning her credibilty. The attempt to discredit because Mrs. Peery
inadvertently used the words ''or his boys did it''
j s ridiculous.
At page 4 appellant mentions that the court failed
to bring in as third parties the Federal Land Bank because of an unsatisfied mortgage and the State of
Utah because of the existence of a Public Welfare Lien,
both given by plaintiff, in violation of Civil Rules 13(g).
The record does not show that counsel for appellant
even suggested bringing them in to the court. If counsel
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· regarded their presence necessary for a compltete .determination under the rule, then he should have made the
suggestion to the court rather than now con1plain. Nor
does he show ho'v failure to bring in either or both of
the1n failed to give complete relief in the action, and it
is difficult to see just why they should be made parties.
If either party viewed,t the property at all before·
tnaking the Inortgage they certainly made it with reference to fence lines as being the property line and
if so, upon a foreclosure the mortgage can always be
corrected to properly describe the property intended.
.A.t any rate, all counsel does is mentions the matter.
He does not argue or cite any authority so he must
be deemed to have waived the matter.
Point No.6: COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING DESIGNATION TO BE TARDILY FILED
NOR SHOULD RULE 75(b) BE AMMENDED.
Finally at page 19 appellant complains that contrary to the spirit and purpose of Rule 75 (e) the court
arbit!arily required him to furnish respondents' with
the entire transcript; On June 21, 1952 counsel for
appellant served on counsel for respondent, Designation of Record, etc., ( tr. 35) in which appears among
other things the simple statement: ''Transcript of the
evidence served herewith.'' Later when counsel obtained
the transcript for purpose of preparation of appeal it
\Yas observed that the notes transcribed were only
those requested by counsel for appellant, that in no
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instance 'vas the full testimony of any witness report ..

ed and that approximately one-third of the testimony
'vas eliminated in the opinion of the reporter, (tr.
148) (It finally turned out that 82 pages were omitted
and 96 transcribed). In other words, counsel for appellant had ordered transnribed for the use of respondents
such testin1ony as he chose. At the time of service
of the designation there was nothing to indicate that
the whole of the preceedings had not been transcribed.
If only part was transcribed, it should have expressJs
so stated or counsel should have been so advised. At any
rnte, it mislead counsel for respondents. He therefort~
filed Demand for Additional Evidence, etc., (tr. 39
to 43) and counsel complains at the court's order
requiring entire transcript of evidence. The record
further shows that this cause was tried Sept. 21, 1951,
and that several continuances was had.

Appellant complains that no designation was made
as to what additional testimony was required to be
transcribed. Such a request it is submitted is unreasonable and not contemplated by any rule. No lawyer
could be expected to recall what bits or even large
portions of important testimony was elin1inated, or
the materiality thereof.He could not therefore be able
to designate what omitted part should be added without
having the court reporter read the notes to him and such
a requirement should not be imposed upon any respondent. Respondents use of transcript on appeal should
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never be limited to what appellant's counsel thinks he
should have. In this instance, for example, all of the
testhnony explanatory of the picture exhibits have been
o1nitted, ·besides 1nuch corroboration testimony. Then
too abstracts gotten out in piecen1eal are not satisfactory. That is apparent fron1 the transcripts furnished
here,vith because it is very difficult to read the second
transcript marked '' B '' even though the reporter made
references in the best way he knew how.
Rule 75 (b) Transcript, provides in part as follo,vs:
"If the designation does not include all of the evidence~
the appellant shall file a copy of such part thereof
as the respondent may need to enable him to designate
the part he desires to have added, and if the appellants
fail to do so the court on motion may require him
to furnish the additional part needed.'' This is just
what the court did on affidavit, etc., of counsel for
respondents. And, it is believed, Rule 75 (e), ''Record
to be Abbreviated'' does not refer to the qustion here
presented. It refers to omitting formal parts of exhibits,
1nore than one copy of any document, omitting irrele-vant
and formal portions of documents, or for the unnecessary substitution by one party of evidence in question
and answer form for a fair narrative statement proposed by another. None of these things happened, so
there was no violation of this rule. If the rule were·
applied as contended for by appellant, then if respondent shall recover upon appeal he would be taxed
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'vith costs for additional transcript and without which
he n1ight not have prevailed had fie not ordered more
than appelTant arbitrarily had: transcribed. It is contended that appellant';s contention is entirely untenable)

and that the: rule should notbe amend-ed. Nor did the
court violate any rule': in requiring appellant to furnish
transcript co:ve:uin1g all evidence.
IN CON·cr.JUSION- it is submitted that the decision
of the lower court is fair and equitable· between the
parties· and finds- support both in. the facts·. and the
la,v, and that it would. be inequitable at this late date
to grant appellant's appeaL for recovery of 19 feet (or
any part- thereof): of ground!, the-· difference between1
the lines established by the boundary line fenc~ by'
plaintiff and defendant's predecessors iii interest about·
45~ yeaTs ago and] the d-escription~ contained· ini deed,
or· to :require, these· defendants to pay any taxes, etc.
thereon, particularly when; appellant himself has: paid
no taxes, etc~, other· than: those· which; covered· the.
property he has always enjoyed: and been in·· possession
of, e·ven if it· did not actually on the ground liappen1
to cov-er tlie description contained~ in the deed~ The
decision of the~ lower court is entitled to·· be affirmed·
in all' particulars, together withr respondents~ costsIn. con:neetion with this appeal..
Respectfully submitted,_
George C. Heinrich,
Attorney for Defendants and Respondents.
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